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ABSTRACT 
We simulate social network games of a portfolio selection to analyze the role of liquidity 
individuals for the developments in individuals’ decision-making in financial markets. Liquidity 
individuals prove to be a significant element in the decision-making process of the entire network, 
as they keep the information of non-dominant strategies alive. Their role is especially significant 
under omniscient individuals, whereas a little less under non-omniscient individuals. As long as 
individuals do not lose the information of all the alternatives, their role is insignificant. 
 
Keywords: liquidity individuals, social networks, decision-making, portfolio 
analysis, stochastic finance. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Decisions of individuals on financial markets can generally be described through 
uncertainty, seeking for information about the securities, and social networks 
(Axelrod 1984; Watts and Strogatz 1998; Wasserman and Faust 1994), with 
preferences, knowledge and other individual specific characteristics its key 
elements. Individuals on the markets are non-omniscient individuals each 
possessing a small bit of the entire knowledge (Hayek 1945). To say that 
individuals acquire information they need from their presence in the social 
networks is to say that individuals do not only learn from their experience, but 
also from the experiences of others. Such processes induce herd behavior and lead 
to synchronous decisions in time (Bikhchandani et al. 1998; Banerjee 1992).  
 
In the model, we assume that individuals change the strategy they use and pick the 
one that they believe will bring them highest outcome. This is done by observing 
past outcomes of the strategies they use, or past outcomes of the efficiencies of 
the strategies used by individuals to whom they are connected. However, we also 
assume that some of individuals never change the alternative they choose in the 
beginning, no matter of its efficiency or the efficiency of the alternatives. This is 
in line with Rubinstein (1998) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and findings 
from the behavioral studies (Hirshleifer 2001). As individuals face a tradeoff 
between the complexity of one strategy on one side and its efficiency and 
prospects of a successful implementation of the strategy on the other they are 
much less prone to changing the strategy they satisfactorily pursue for some time. 
This has several different effects to the outcome of the game. Not only this 
corresponds to the preferences of individuals, but such individuals also appear as 
liquidity individuals in the game, keeping the information about the non-dominant 
alternatives alive and available to the others in the network throughout the game. 
Without such individuals, some consecutive worse outcomes of some alternatives 
might convey that such alternatives cease to exist. Despite they might be 
worthwhile in the longer run. In this article, we consider that deficiency.  
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Games are simulated using real data, with individuals using social networks and 
choosing between the stocks of two bank corporations, Citigroup (NYSE: C) and 
CreditSuisse (NYSE: CS), or the portfolio of the two. Section 2 presents the 
model in short and Section 3 the results. Article ends with short concluding 
remarks. 
 
2 General framework 
2.1 The model 
 
There are ( )1, 2, ,1000A = …  infinitely lived agents, distributed on the lattice and 
connected in the small world network (Watts and Strogatz 1998; Wasserman and 
Faust 1994). On average, each individual in the network is connected to six 
others. 
 
The network ( ),g V E=  is a set of vertices { }1 2 1000, , ,V v v v= … , representing 
agents, and edges { }1 2, , , nE e e e= … , representing their pairwise relations. If two 
agents are connected, we denote ij g∈ , while ij g∉  represents two unconnected 
vertices. Using adjacency matrix, 1ij =  if ij g∈  and 0ij =  if ij g∉ . We use 
undirected graph, where edges are unordered pairs of vertices, thus if 
1 1ij ji= ⇔ = . In a small world network, people have many local and some 
global connections with others, which we get by rewiring some of the 
connections.  
 
According to their initial preferences, individuals are split into two groups; the 
first consists of those who prefer Citigroup stocks, and the second of those who 
prefer CreditSuisse stocks. The share of individuals who prefer stocks of 
CreditSuisse are denoted 0 1u≤ ≤ , whereas ( )1 u−  individuals prefer Citigroup 
stocks. Individuals from both groups can choose between pure strategy, either to 
opt for Citigroup or CreditSuisse stocks or make a portfolio of the two. We denote 
with C , if individuals who prefer Citigroup stocks decide for pure strategies and 
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Cp  if they opt for a portfolio. Individuals preferring CrediSuisse stocks and 
decide for pure CreditSuisse stocks strategies are denoted CS  and CSp  if they 
opt for a portfolio. In either case, portfolio is selected from the part of stocks one 
prefers, 0 1pi≤ ≤ , while remainder ( )1 pi−  represents stocks of the other 
company. Individuals accumulate their wealth in time according to the strategy 
they choose, while they can change between the strategies in every period during 
the game. 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [ ]
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
1
t C t C
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t CSp t CSp
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W A W A Cr pi CSr pi
W A W A CSr pi Cr pi
W A W A CSr
+
+
+
+
= ⋅ +
⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ −⎣ ⎦
= ⋅ +
 (1). 
 
( )1tW + •  and ( )tW •  represent wealth of an individual in time t  and 1t + , while 
( )•  denotes the strategy played by an individual in time. Returns of stocks, 
denoted Cr  and CSr , are exogenous to the individuals and they cannot foresee 
them, neither do they know the system how prices change in time. There is a 
discrete time interval on ( )1, 2, , 2457t = … . The level of omniscience of agents is 
defined through Fermi logistic probability function (Szabó and Tőke 1998) as 
 
( ) ( )( ) 11 exp i jW A W A κ −⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤℘= + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  (2) 
 
This means that in every time period t  an agent iA  chooses one of the individuals 
to which he is directly connected, jA , and compares his payoff, ( )iW A , to the 
payoff of a selected individual, ( )jW A . It depends upon the level of coefficient 
κ  which strategy an individual iA  will adopt. For 0κ = , individual always 
adopts the strategy that gives higher outcome. Such individual is said to be 
omniscient. Higher the value of κ  and smaller the difference between the two 
payoffs, more likely it is that an individual does not choose the strategy with 
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higher payoff. Such individual is characterized as non-omniscient. Contrary, 
lower the value of a coefficient κ  and bigger the difference between the two 
payoffs, more likely it is that an individual chooses the strategy with higher 
payoff. In simulations, we use omniscient individual with 0.001κ =  and non-
omniscient with 1.0κ = . 
 
We assume that a portion of individuals, denoted ( )0,1l∈ , never change their 
strategies. Such individuals assure the liquidity of all alternatives in the game and 
could be named liquidity individuals. We set 0.1l =  and assume that whatever 
their strategy, these are individuals numbered from 901 1000n≤ ≤  from 1000n =  
individuals. In the games, liquidity individuals pursue all four alternatives, which 
are randomly defined in the beginning of the games. 
 
2.2 Data 
 
Data is used from finance.yahoo.com portal. Data refer to adjusted closed prices 
of both stocks from 21.1.1999 until 19.11.2008. An adjusted closed price is a 
price adjusted for splits and dividends. In order to use the same time-period for 
both stocks, we omit adjusted closed prices for the stock for a time units if the 
other stock was inactive on that day. 
 
3 Simulation results 
3.1 Omniscient individuals 
 
We first simulate individual games with omniscient individuals under different 
initial values of u  and plot their entire developments. 
 
0.5u =  
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We first choose 0.5u =  and 0.3pi = , whereas u  is changing in time and pi  is 
constant. We make two independent realizations of the game and plot the results 
in Figures 1a and 1b. C  in figures represent the share of individuals that choose 
Citigroup, Cp  represent the share of individuals who prefer Citigroup stocks and 
choose for a portfolio. Similarly, CS  and CSp  represent the shares of individuals 
who prefer CreditSuisse stocks and opt for pure strategies or portfolio. 
 
Figure 1a: Omniscient individuals pursuing each alternative 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Omniscient individuals pursuing each alternative 
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Through great part of the game, the possession of Citigroup stocks is a dominant 
strategy played by omniscient individuals. Figures clearly demonstrate the 
significance of liquidity individuals for the developments in the games. As they 
assure that the information of dominated alternatives are not lost and remain at the 
disposal to others, individuals are able to switch from once dominant to once 
dominated strategies as the game proceeds and circumstances in the game change. 
 
In the games, we see that the presence of liquidity individuals leads to the decline 
of the share of individuals possessing only stocks of Citigroup and towards the 
alternatives that include CreditSuisse stocks. With no liquidity individuals, such 
switch is not possible as individuals lose the information about the alternative 
strategies, which happens in the early stages of the game. 
 
0.8u =  
 
We now increase the initial share of individuals preferring stocks of CreditSuisse, 
thus 0.8u = . The value of 0.3pi =  is constant in time. The shares of individuals 
opting for each alternative are plotted in Figure 2a for the first realization of the 
game and in Figure 2b for the second. 
 
Figure 2a: Omniscient individuals pursuing each alternative 
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Figure 2b: Omniscient individuals pursuing each alternative 
 
 
 
Again, we see that the role of liquidity individuals for the developments of the 
games is significant, as they keep the information of all the alternatives alive 
throughout the game, for which they all could be used by all the rest as the game 
proceeds. 
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3.2 Non-omniscient individuals 
 
We now turn to non-omniscient agents with 1.0κ =  and make simulations of 
individual games under different values of variables u  and pi . 
 
0.5u =  
 
Again, groups of individuals preferring each stock are in the start of equal size, 
thus 0.5u = , and are changing in time, while 0.3pi =  is constant throughout the 
game. Figure 3a depicts the shares of individuals choosing each alternative in the 
first realization of the game and Figure 3b present the results of the second 
realization of the game. 
 
Figure 3a: Non-omniscient individuals pursuing each alternative 
 
 
 
Figure 3b: Non-omniscient individuals pursuing each alternative 
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From the Figures, we see that the role of non-omniscient individuals is not as 
significant for the liquidity of alternative strategies as is the role of omniscient 
individuals. This is because non-omniscient individuals do not react so prompt to 
the changing circumstances as omniscient individuals do, for which they do not 
lose the information about the alternative investments as fast as omniscient 
individuals do. However, in Figure 3a liquidity individuals are significant for the 
existence of the alternative Cp  and in Figure 3b for alternatives CS  and C . 
 
0.8u =  
 
Again, groups of individuals preferring each stock are in the start of equal size, 
thus 0.8u = , and are changing in time, while 0.3pi =  is constant throughout the 
game. Figure 4a and Figure 4b present the results of the two independent 
realizations of the games. 
 
Figure 4a: Non-omniscient individuals pursuing each alternative 
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Figure 4b: Non-omniscient individuals pursuing each alternative 
 
 
 
The role of liquidity individuals is nicely represented in the Figure 4a and Figure 
4b. In both realizations of the game, liquidity individuals prove to be significant 
for the existence of the alternative Cp . In the first realization of the game Cp  
alternative was used by others three times after liquidity individuals kept it alive 
(Figure 4a), whereas in the second realization only liquidity individuals pursue a 
Cp  alternative from the time interval 406t =  on (Figure 4b). In time intervals 
close to the end of the game, liquidity individuals prove to be a decisive element 
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in keeping the information of the alternative C  alive, which is necessary for the 
liquidity of a stock. This shift reflects the effects of the financial crisis, which put 
stocks of Citigroup much lower than the stocks of CreditSuisse. 
 
4 Concluding remarks 
 
In the article, we feature the role liquidity individuals have for the developments 
of the decision-making in the portfolio management. We demonstrate the 
decisiveness of the role of such liquidity individuals in the process of the 
decision-making of all the individuals in the network, working according to the 
principle of invisible hand. Because they keep the information of the all non-
dominant alternatives alive, they prevent such information to get lost, which 
would happen with no such individuals in the network. Therefore, all alternatives, 
despite once strictly dominated, remain liquid and ready to be pursued as the 
game proceeds and the relevant information of the alternatives change. 
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Figures’ legend 
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C , plotted with black line, represents the share of agents who prefer Citigroup stocks and play 
pure strategies, Cp , plotted with red line, represents the share of agents who prefer Citigroup 
stocks and opt for a portfolio. CS , plotted with green line, and CSp , plotted with blue line, 
represent shares of agents who prefer CreditSuisse stocks and opt for pure strategies or portfolio. 
